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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

The Honorable William Benton
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear *Bice* ~~Senator Benton~~:

A member of your staff was kind enough to forward to me an advance copy of your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last Monday, 17 February 1958.

I noted with considerable interest your comments on United States propaganda and information programs and believe that these provide a basis for a realistic and constructive appraisal of our past and future efforts in this field. I was particularly interested in the suggestions which you made regarding ways and means to seize the propaganda initiative from the Soviet government and to convey our message regarding our aims and desire for peace to the Russian people.

You have performed a worthwhile service in bringing the ideas which result from your long experience in the field of information and propaganda to the attention of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress. The imaginative approaches you have suggested are worthy of earnest consideration.

Sincerely,

~~ALLEN W. DULLES~~ *sc*
Director

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2 FEB 1958

The Honorable William Benton
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

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Sincerely,

Signed

ALLEN W. DULLES *lc*
Director

Signature Recommended:

✓ Deputy Director (Plans)

Date: 27 FEB 1958

cc: DDCI

DDP/PP/

24 Feb 1958

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

O/DCI

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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CONFIDENTIAL

25 FEB 1958

Executive
10-14541

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deputy Director (Plans) *[initials]*

SUBJECT:

Senator Benton's Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

1. This memorandum is for the action of the DCI. Such action is contained in paragraph 4.

2. We have marked some of the most significant pages in Senator Benton's comments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but I recommend that if you have the time it would be worth your while to peruse the entire testimony since it is so well organized and so pertinent. Many of the ideas which Senator Benton puts forward are obviously for overt exploitation either in speeches by the President or Secretary of State or for USIA action. (However, it seems to us that you may wish to suggest to the OCB that one of its committees review this testimony along with the full transcript of the Committee discussion which we will forward to you as soon as it is available.)

3. of this Staff, and I met with Senator Benton's assistants prior to his testimony to discuss certain information which he might wish to include on Soviet propaganda. Thus, it is worth noting that he did lay considerable stress on Khrushchev's speech at Minsk, a copy of which we had provided, pointing out some of the obvious vulnerabilities included in that speech.

4. It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to Senator Benton.

25X1

Chief

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

Attachment: letter
cc: DDCI

Note for the record: 3 March '58

informed telecon this date the DCI's view with regard to paragraph bracketed-- "DCI not quite sure that he wants to get this into the OCB hopper. However, if wishes to have one of the committees read it, it was all right with him." Letter to Benton signed. JMC

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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	1. DD/P - Mr. [redacted] 2. Mr. [redacted] STAT	24 Feb	24 Feb 58
2	2038 L	[Signature]	
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4	[redacted] [redacted] VPP	[Signature]	25 Feb
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
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
Attached is a copy of Sen. Benton's prepared statement which he presumably gave as his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last Monday. Mr. Dulles asks that you sideline certain portions which he should read and prepare an appropriate letter of thanks for his signature to Sen. Benton.

I have informed Larry Houston that this material has been received and he said to tell you that he is continuing to try and get the actual transcript of testimony as given by Sen. Benton.

SUSPENSE - 25 Feb 58

STAT FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[redacted]	21 Feb 58



Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400620019-4

Feb. 15, 1958

STAT

Memo from

Senator Benton asked me to send you an advance copy of his testimony to be presented Monday morning, February 17 at 10 a.m. to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The main body of the testimony begins on page 5.

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400620019-4

Testimony before
U. S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations
February 17, 1958, 10:00 A.M.
by William Benton
Publisher, Encyclopaedia Britannica

Background Comments

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the Committee on these hearings which could not be more timely. I hope they will help the American people to regain perspective. When the Sputniks went up, the missile experts of our army, navy and air corps suddenly seemed as valuable as the Minute Men at Concord and Lexington, as indispensable as Britain's fighter pilots after the fall of France.

But the fact remains that the primary threat to America and the free world is far more than military. Mr. Khrushchev has repeatedly challenged us to a duel to the death - a duel between his system and ours - a contest not of arms but of economics, diplomacy and ideology. He seems sure he can win without using the missiles.

Senator Green has invited me to testify on the psychological aspects of this duel and indeed the impact of the sputniks is primarily psychological. I shall concentrate largely on the Iron Curtain, and I shall make some proposals for knifing through it.

However, I deeply appreciate the great issues with which this Committee is wrestling. A deep chasm today divides the U. S. from the USSR on such questions as German unification, the Eastern European satellites, outer space, the so-called Rapacki Plan, world trade, etc., etc. When I served as Assistant Secretary of State under Secretaries Byrnes and Marshall, I used to comment that all problems of foreign policy could be summarized in four one-syllable words: force, goods, deeds and words. Today, I shall deal only with words,

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and with deeds as they are designed to create words. Or, to put it more bluntly, I shall present to the Committee a few of my thoughts on the subject of propaganda.

I happen to think that the conduct of American foreign policy is not only studded with failures in our diplomacy which your Committee proposes to examine; with failures in our military policy as exemplified by the Sputniks; with mistakes in our foreign trade policy going back at least a full generation; but over and above these three areas which are widely discussed and debated, our foreign policy has been studded with failures and blunders in the field of propaganda, and these go back the full quarter century or more since propaganda became a recognized tool of a nation's overseas activity.

In 1935, when the then Prince of Wales dedicated a building in London to the British Council, he commented that Great Britain was the last of the great nations of the world to recognize the importance of cultural relations in the conduct of foreign policy. The United States officially first took note of this importance with the appointment of Nelson Rockefeller as co-ordinator of inter-American affairs in 1940. I was one of the three top consultants appointed by Mr. Rockefeller when he took office. Thus my interest in this field goes back to its very inception in U. S. policy. However, my major responsibilities in it developed only when Secretary Byrnes and President Truman asked me to take the appointment of Assistant Secretary of State in August of 1945 when, at the end of the war, the Office of Inter-American Affairs and the OWI, the two great war agencies charged with propaganda policy, were shifted into the State Department.

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The Secretary of State was instructed to come up with an overseas program which would "present a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government." This objective became my responsibility.

When Secretary Byrnes and Senator Vandenberg returned from the Paris Conference in June of 1946, Secretary Byrnes appeared with me before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate. Based on his five months' experience with the Russians in Paris, he said, "The broadcasts in Russian which in my absence Secretary Benton started from Munich, at an annual cost of only \$135,000, are worth to the people of the United States the entire \$20 million which he is seeking for his program of information and cultural relations." The Congress passed the appropriation as requested.

With Secretary Byrnes' resignation, and with the advent of the 80th Congress in 1947, came the bitter attack upon the new program. Indeed, it became a number one target of the Republican National Committee and of some of the great private groups in the field of communications. The bill which later became known as the Smith-Mundt Act, which I helped to write and then sponsored on behalf of the State Department, precipitated a debate on the floor of the House of Representatives which Senator Monroney, then a Congressman, told me was more bitter and prolonged than any bill in his ten years in the Congress. Senator Mundt reminded me only last month that the time given to this debate was 50% longer than that accorded the highly controversial Taft-Hartley Act which passed in the same session.

When I resigned from the Department in the fall of 1947, with the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act assured, and the Fulbright Act and UNESCO legislation already through the Congress, Secretary Hull

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told me that he regarded the validation of the program for which I had been responsible, in view of the widespread opposition both in Congress and throughout the country, as nothing short of "a miracle."

Later, when I served in the Senate, I renewed my interest in this controversial area of our foreign policy, and I hope some of the members of your Committee may recall the hearings on my resolution calling for a Marshall Plan in the field of ideas. These were conducted by a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Senator Thomas and among the witnesses were President Eisenhower, General Marshall and Secretary Dulles.

More recently, in 1955, I visited the Soviet Union and since then have written and spoken widely on the USSR's propaganda techniques.

I sketch this background to remind the Committee of my long interest in the area on which I am testifying today.

* * * * *

Since I left the Senate five years ago, the USIA has been ripped out of the State Department; the management and direction of the agency has suffered from frequent changes and shakeups; the ill-fated trip of Cohn and Schine and the attacks of Senator McCarthy shook the agency to its foundations; its key personnel has sought in vain for career status; and all in all, although the appropriations of the agency have increased somewhat, the USIA can only be called the sick and cast-off child of the State Department.

The handling of our propaganda has thus been isolated from policy and from the general conduct of our foreign affairs, rather than regarded as an integral part of it. Perhaps, in view of the hazards of the 12-1/2 post-war years, I should be pleased that we

have made some progress - instead of complaining about our lost opportunities. However, I urge upon this Committee that it now give to this area in the conduct of our foreign policy the top attention that it deserves. One reason I deem these hearings to be of high importance is that they promise such an approach.

Importance of reaching the

Russian People

Two years ago, Christian Pineau of France, present foreign minister and former premier, said: "If Communist propaganda can continue indefinitely in the West, while the West cannot spread its propaganda in Communist countries, then one day we shall all be subjugated. This is my firm conviction."

Pineau said our hope of survival rests upon the ability of the Western nations to reach the Russian people. Only when propaganda becomes a two-way street, he said, will there be an opportunity to "modify profoundly" the intransigent attitude of the Soviet regime.

The diplomats of Washington may scoff at Bulganin's letters, but those of Asia and Africa do not. Indeed, each and every one should have been answered in exhaustive detail, not for the American people but for those for whom the letters were actually intended. The primary purpose of the most recent letters, as everyone knows, was to blanket the NATO meeting in Paris and to emphasize the great, pure and peaceful aims of the Soviet Union while the Western nations were talking about armaments. The letters reached the world, but no replies to them from us reached the Russian people.

Khrushchev's world-wide success as a publicist is founded on the fact that this is a peace-hungry world. His formula seldom varies, and good Marxist dogma it is: we want peace and you want war. His current theme is Let us get together and build a better world.

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Some weeks back, he proposed a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to take up nuclear armaments. Time after time he has suggested another "summit" meeting. He has also hinted that, to end the present impasse, Russia and the United States should perhaps go it alone in bilateral talks.

Deeds vs Words

Khrushchev has known in advance what the free world's answers would be. They are nearly always an anguished, "NO". The world is told that we won't be taken in by Khrushchev's obvious propaganda tricks; and further that Communist Russia must prove its good intentions by deeds and not words. This last maxim has been used so often that it seems to have frozen the creative thinking of the West and indeed, in today's world is not the maxim being misapplied? Are deeds really as much more important than words as we like to think? Could it be, as Mr. Pineau suggests, that we have missed the key to Communist success, and thus helped insure our own futility?

I suspect that those of our diplomatic leaders, and these include Democrats of the last administration as well as Republicans of this - I suspect that those who keep saying, "It is the deed, not the word that counts," are doing us a great disservice. Ideally, I agree that what counts is the deed and it counts most when coupled with the word. However, the word can obscure and minimize and offset a bad deed. Furthermore, sometimes words generate desired deeds. When Khrushchev calls for a "summit" conference, isn't

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that his effort by the words of propaganda to create the deed he desires?

Since World War II, the United States has acted with unprecedented generosity in the conduct of its foreign affairs. It has given to friend and former foe alike. It even offered to foresake its monopoly of nuclear weapons on equitable terms. During this same time, Communist Russia has followed a policy often based upon intrigue, terror, force and the suppression of human values. Yet on the barometer of world esteem, the prestige of the Moscow government appears to be rising steadily. Ours has fallen to a new low. This hardly supports the thesis that "deeds and not words" form the only ultimate test.

Samuel Adams didn't hesitate to launch his Committee of Correspondence against the might of the British Empire. He got powerful assistance from the stirring words of Thomas Jefferson and Tom Paine. Are we not today, in our timid and fearful attitude towards propaganda, neglecting a powerful spiritual weapon of our common heritage? The Communists are not neglecting theirs. Lenin wrote in 1905 that "propaganda is of crucial importance for the triumph of the party." He knew that ideas are the weapons of propaganda. He knew well, as Lord Keynes put it, that "soon or late it is ideas, not economic interests which are dangerous for good or evil." When I served in the State Department, I watched the Communist propaganda soften up China for conquest. And China fell more to propaganda than to military might.

Last month a Gallup poll in New Delhi turned up the following percentages on its question, "Which is doing more to help peace

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in the world -- Russia or the West?": Russia 54%; West 18%; don't know 28%. Note the ratio: 3 to 1 for Russia.

The same poll asked citizens of 12 world capitals, "Who is ahead in the 'cold war', Russia or the West?" Russia was rated ahead in 10 capitals - in some cases by four or five to one among those who gave definite answers - and the West in only two - and, please note this, one of the two was New Delhi.

USSR Calls the Rules

I believe that after investigation your Committee will conclude that the USSR is shellacking us with its propaganda. Further, I think you will discover that the U. S. has foolishly allowed Russia to call the rules of the propaganda game.

Now there is no law of international comity which suggests that certain nations shall have an exclusive privilege of defaming the good names of others throughout large areas of the world. This of course is possible only because of the complete veto power of the Communist countries over news and information from the West. Because of this, the Iron Curtain can nullify our attempts to reach an agreement for the easing of international tensions.

There is, of course, irony in the fact that a ruthless dictatorship may use the tools of freedom to win a supreme psychological advantage over nations which cherish these tools as the touchstone of their culture. And there is further irony in the fact that Khrushchev, who wields this psychological whip, heads a government which is deeply troubled by the urge for freedom and liberty now running among its own subjects.

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I suggest that it's time the free nations got up off the psychoanalyst's couch and started hitting the Soviet Union psychologically at its weakest point. That point is the Iron Curtain which blocks its people from exposure to the developing world around them.

For too many years, the West has accepted the delusion that the iron Curtain is invincible. That view is a most pernicious outcropping of a Western inferiority complex.

Vulnerability of USSR

The Soviet Government is vulnerable because it has consistently deceived its own people. If we can get through to the Russian people, the arrogance of the Soviet propaganda will visibly melt. If we can crack the Iron Curtain, it should be possible to create a world climate of opinion in which no nation would dare employ nuclear weapons to make war or to use its stockpile to intimidate other peoples. Essential to this climate of opinion is the attitude of the peoples within the USSR. Increasingly it seems evident that only through their understanding can worthwhile disarmament agreements evolve. Peace talks will be futile until the Russian people are brought into the world community of thought. Further, we should do all we can to bring an understanding of this to other countries throughout the world.

The first step is to shake up our psychological approach to the Soviet impasse from cellar to garret. We must ourselves announce a peace program, both bold and imaginative, and so comprehensive in its terms that its purpose and scope will snatch

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the peace initiative from the Soviet Union. The bedrock for such a program lies scattered over a dozen different proposals and policies over the past dozen years. The target of the program, as Mr. Pineau suggested, must be the peoples of the Communist bloc.

It is necessary to make a change of 180 degrees in the arc of our propaganda policy -- from "No" to "Yes." For example, why should not every Moscow peace proposal for a summit meeting -- why should it not be accepted with alacrity -- but with our own "if" -- upon the strict proviso that such deliberations should be made known in full to the Russian people.

In his many roles beside that of peacemaker, Mr. Khrushchev fancies himself as the leading exponent for the new people-to-people diplomacy -- that movement of broader cultural, social and scientific ties across national boundaries. This is the new diplomacy of the rocket age and Khrushchev has exploited it with his usual artistry. Does this not give us a superb opportunity to challenge him to open up the Iron Curtain? And to keep challenging him to admit publicly that he is afraid to let in the truth to the Russian people?

A race to the moon is advertised as the next contest in the scientific sweepstakes between the Communists and the free nations. It would be nice for us to win that race. It might be even nicer if we asked Mr. Khrushchev to join us in a cooperative venture by which we could reach the moon together. But in my judgment it is infinitely more important to reach the Russian people than it is to get to the moon.

Mr. Khrushchev's speech of January 22nd in Minsk, which hasn't

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received the attention it deserved in this country, illustrates my thesis that ideas can get through the Iron Curtain, and that the Kremlin is sensitive to the impact of ideas on its public. This was a speech intended for a local audience, and apparently spontaneous. Much of it was a belligerent reply to President Eisenhower. The status of the countries of East Europe is not a subject for discussion at a summit conference, Khrushchev said; the idea of a plebiscite is ridiculous. The idea prevalent in the West that the 20th Congress of the Communist Party caused or revealed division and confusion in the socialist world must be controverted. Khrushchev agreed with President Eisenhower's thesis that deeds, not words, are what count; let the U.S. display deeds by giving up the bases which ring the Soviet Union.

(I shall be happy to submit the text of Khrushchev's speech, which I do not believe has been published in the U.S.)

Has there perhaps been a subtle transition in American thinking and policy within recent weeks? If so, this is most promising. Governor Stevenson has suggested a world conclave of distinguished private citizens to explore and make recommendations for ending the deadly armaments race. President Eisenhower has suggested a meeting of humanists, gathered from across the earth, to assess the world's condition and to make suggestions for making it a better place in which to live.

Recently, and more importantly, President Eisenhower wrote a letter to Bulganin which posed positive and constructive proposals, such as the abolition of the veto in the UN, a letter which the Soviets haven't seemingly known how to answer, at least not yet.

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Such ideas are positive though tentative steps which express the genuine idealism of the American people. I suggest to this Committee today that we must group these overtures and develop them into a full symphony.

How to Break the Iron Curtain

We have at hand the weapons to break the Iron Curtain. One weapon, as suggested by Khrushchev's speech in Minsk, is the world-wide moral power of the Presidency of the United States. Great Presidents like Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt never hesitated to use it and the influence they wielded stands unmatched in the temporal affairs of men. They literally shook up the world with their ideas about freedom and the essential need for human brotherhood.

Here are some further suggestions of the kind of positive things which I believe we should be doing; these are merely samples:

1. President Eisenhower might announce his desire to make a peace appeal directly to the Russian people and request the co-operation of the Soviet Government in providing the necessary press and radio facilities. A talk of this nature would be one of the most dramatic in world history. As an aid to peace it could be worth a dozen summit meetings. He could even ask for a monthly talk to the Russian people, and offer Khrushchev the same opportunity here.

2. The Soviet proposal for a special session of the General

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Assembly of the United Nations to discuss disarmament should be accepted -- with the strict proviso that the deliberations at this meeting shall be fully reported by the Soviet press and radio to the Russian people, as they will be to ours.

3. The Congress could adopt a resolution expressing its sense that the United Nations should take the lead in sponsoring complete freedom in the exchange of news and information between the people of the Communist countries and the people of the United States. (This was the dream of the U.S. delegation, of which I was chairman, at the UN Conference on Freedom of Information in Geneva in 1948.)

4. Some engineering experts are now convinced that a breakthrough is possible of the Soviet radio jamming. Responsible estimates put the cost to the USSR of jamming at \$114,000,000 annually, more than the total budget of the USIA.

One responsible expert tells me there is a possible way to end the jamming -- not a certainty, but with perhaps an even chance of success -- and that a research expenditure of less than \$1 million might produce the new technique required. I happen to think such a technique would be a bargain to the U.S. at the Soviet annual cost of \$114,000,000. Our top physicists are needed on this project at least as much as for satellites.

5. The United States should tell the Russians again and again that we shall be glad to have them operate a radio station in Washington if they will permit us to operate one in Moscow. This was a proposal I made publicly twelve or more years ago when I was serving as Assistant Secretary of State.

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6. The world should be told once again that if Soviet Russia will agree to a rigid system of nuclear disarmament, the United States is prepared to spend as much as ten billions annually to help the economic development of less favored nations. The savings on armaments alone would make this possible. This was a proposal of my colleague, Senator Brien McMahon.

7. Why shouldn't we ask the Soviets to take all of our students they are willing to accommodate at their universities? We need young people who speak Russian. I happen to think our students there, as evidenced by countless reports, would be great ambassadors for our way of life.

(There's of course no real hope of the Soviets agreeing to exchange two or three hundred thousand students, though the offer seems worth making. But why should we not encourage a quarter-million American students to study abroad? The "tidal wave" of American youngsters due to hit our colleges will raise the number of qualified applicants from the present three million to six million by 1970. College administrators see little or no hope of doubling their facilities. Tuition and living costs at foreign universities, even the most famous, average substantially less than private U.S. colleges and universities. Would it not contribute greatly to international understanding if 250,000 young Americans were enrolled abroad every year? This seems to me a good idea, and it's a cheap idea because it won't cost our economy any more than if we keep these students at home. Such a positive proposal would, I believe, arouse world-wide interest, particularly if coupled with a more aggressive program to bring foreign students to this country.)

8. We should at once begin the construction of vastly expanded and more powerful radio transmitters, beamed behind the Iron Curtain; and indeed we would press with more vigor every idea that holds any reasonable promise of eroding the curtain.

- 15 -

9. We should mobilize our science and engineering talent to devise means of obtaining compulsory access to the Soviet audience. Further, Soviet scientists want contact with ours; they don't argue about the facts of science; our scientists can become most potent ambassadors.

* * * *

There is no belligerency in proposals such as these. Indeed, they reflect the desire of the American people for lasting peace.

A talk by the President to the Russian people will capture the imagination of men everywhere if only because all mankind has a stake in the outcome of the present armaments race. Our Chief Executive could assure the frightened masses of the USSR that our democratic and spiritual background is a firm guaranty that nuclear weapons will never be used for an assault upon the Soviet Union. He can give renewed assurance that the United States and its Allies are ready now, as they have been for a decade, to enter a fair and effective pact for the banishment of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the summit meeting, which the Kremlin is promoting and which seems increasingly imminent, could provide the perfect opening for a talk by the President to the Russian people.

Next, the moral prestige of the Congress in world affairs is great and we have neglected this potential weapon. In suggesting that the United States should assume the lead in boring a hole in the Iron Curtain, the Congress will be following the

- 16 -

precedent it established seven years ago when it passed the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution expressing the sincere desire of the American people for lasting friendship with the people of Russia. This resolution was sponsored by two of the most eminent representatives of my state who have served in the Congress. President Truman sent it to the Soviet Government with the request that it be made known in full to the Russian people. Stalin not only gave it complete coverage by press and radio but he even said that he was willing to approve a limited exchange of news articles between Soviet and American journals. Unfortunately this chink in the Iron Curtain was never followed up. This may have been one of our mistakes.

There are members of this Committee who sponsored this friendship resolution who will be interested to know that a prominent official of our overseas information program assured me not long ago that it was one of the best good-will gestures this country ever made.

Thus I believe that an occasional Congressional resolution can do an immense amount of good and beyond this can uphold the President in his dealings with the USSR. For example, if Congress should suggest that both President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev appear before the United Nations to state their views on disarmament, with full publicity in all countries, this might help us get through to the Russian people.

A Key Soviet Group: the Middle Leadership

In our efforts to penetrate the Iron Curtain, we must remember that it is necessary particularly to reach the middle leadership

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in the Soviet world, its new and rapidly growing class of well-schooled engineers, professional men and administrators. I reported two years ago on this expanding group to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I think it is wise for us, in formulating policy, to share Mr. Allen Dulles' "cautious hope" that it is impossible to educate men and women to think about mathematics, physics and biology - without opening their minds to the possibility of thinking about politics and disarmament and even about justice and freedom.

The top Soviet leadership, which we identify with the Kremlin, can only agree to effective measures of arms reduction and control if the middle leadership is in favor of it. The top leadership must count upon support from the middle leadership; otherwise it will be knifed in the back by rival factions which may interpret any attempt to make a genuine agreement as a betrayal of Soviet interests.

This middle leadership is a tacit constituency that does in fact provide administrative and moral support for the top layers of the Soviet system. Its members tend to favor measures to increase the standard of living of wider and wider circles in the Soviet world. The middle leadership tends to favor measures of decentralization, and a far higher level of reward for skill. It includes the scientists and engineers, and many from the creative arts; the administrators of education, agriculture, transportation, mining, manufacturing, public health planning, construction and finance; and a segment at least of the officers' corps.

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Unless the middle leadership has a steady stream of accurate information about the nature and intentions of Americans, it is left entirely to rumor and to official channels of Soviet propaganda. Its members are now cut off from access to information about us that is in fact vital to their own security. A prime objective of American policy should be to achieve direct contact with this powerful group. If wars begin in the minds of men, as stated in the UNESCO charter which I helped to frame, then hydrogen wars can only begin in hermetically sealed minds. As the London Economist states, "Truth is no longer the first casualty of war; it must be assassinated before war can be made."

However, we shall go wrong in our propaganda policy if we neglect the man at the bottom. We must pursue him too, and with every available means. I like the remark of Voltair, "History is written by the satin slippers going downstairs as the wooden shoes go up."

The U.S. - USSR Cultural Pact

Your Committee asked me to state my views on cultural pacts. The present pact with Russia seems to me to be good, even though it is in one sense a disappointment. It is good in arranging for a small scale exchange of professors and students. It is a disappointment because under its terms the Kremlin retains a complete veto power over the exchange of ideas and political talks. In that sense, the Iron Curtain remains intact.

There is a fundamental difference between what Moscow wants and knows it wants - and what we should want - and don't know we

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want - to accomplish by such pacts. The Kremlin wants technical information to improve its economy. We should be driving for a free flow of ideas as one great way to avoid war. We not only want the Soviet peoples to know more about us; we want to know more about them. It seems to me that we should demand that in exchange for our technical information we be granted access to the USSR. We should seek free play within the USSR for American journalists, broadcasters, sociologists, camera men, political scientists, motion picture operators, labor leaders and opinion-makers generally. We want their admittance into Russia and free movement throughout Russia for a frank review of the contrasting values of Communism and democracy and a constant check on Soviet life and progress. This is what the Soviet Union has to give us in a program of exchanges. This is what we want and what they haven't yet given. In return we are glad to welcome their engineers, technicians and specialists.

The pact states that the proposal to exchange delegations of deputies of the Supreme Soviet and Congress shall be "subject to further discussion." I hope this exchange comes off. There are some plain spoken members of this Committee I should delight to see addressing the Supreme Soviet of Russia and doing so without those inhibitions which naturally circumscribe the work of our diplomatic corps. In fact, an exchange of delegations by Congress and the Supreme Soviet could be the most fruitful exchange of all.

As part of our own efforts within the U.S., the signing of this recent pact with the Soviet Union presents another reason why

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we should seek to untangle our own Red-Tape Curtain, the cumbersome maze of visa, immigration and postal provisions that lead many peoples, including the Russians, to accuse us of erecting our own impenetrable barriers.

Concluding Sum-up

Summed up, the essence of my testimony is this -- let's start talking peace and then back up our words with genuine proposals big enough to meet the menace of rocket warfare. For too long, the Russians have called the rules for international debate. It's time for us to establish a few rules of our own. Lieutenant General Gavin has used that powerful phrase "Missile Blackmail" to describe the present course of the Soviet Government.

Khrushchev's success in stealing the mantle of peace is perhaps without precedent. The United States has the moral weapons to cut Khrushchev's ideas down to manageable proportions. Until that happens, the only alternative seems to be an endless armaments race or something infinitely worse.

Footnote on the USIA

I am not here to discuss the USIA. The head of USIA is at this moment opening the defense of his budget before the House Appropriations subcommittee. I will only say that the USIA budget request for fiscal 1959 -- \$105 millions for operations and \$5 millions for construction of radio facilities -- is far too small -- if we assume that the USIA is to be adequately lead and staffed. It is smaller than the USIA budget for fiscal 1957, and this at a moment when it is becoming dramatically clear that we are losing the psychological duel.

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I would urge the immediate return of U.S. information activities to the Department of State. The USIA was removed from the Department largely on the personal desire of Secretary Dulles to be rid of it. Outside the Department, the USIA has no real voice in policy making. It can only try to pick up the pieces afterward.

USIA belongs in the State Department for many other reasons, including the coordination of its career service with the Foreign Service, and the elimination of duplicating policy staffs and duplicating research and intelligence services. But perhaps the best argument for a reunion is the continuing necessity for improving and educating and building up the State Department, which must remain the key to our overseas operations. The Department, I am told, and especially since Sputnik, has become increasingly sensitive to, and puzzled by, public opinion in foreign lands. I submit that the Department will benefit greatly by such a reunion. The USIA may suffer temporarily. But U.S. foreign relations will improve.

I recommend that, under the over-all direction of the Secretary of State and an Under Secretary, three major Divisions or Departments be created within the State Department - the Department of International Political Affairs, the Department of International Economic Affairs, and the Department of International Public Affairs. These cover three of the four major areas of foreign policy - with which I began those of "deals, goods and words" - leaving "force" to the Department of Defense. Each of the three Departments should have its own Under Secretary, or perhaps even

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its own Secretary as in the Defense Department. Each should have its own Assistant Secretaries. Each of the three Departments should have full line operating authority - and all officers should report up to their own Under Secretary or Secretary, who in turn would report to the Secretary of State.